

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION: HOW POLICE FORCES RELATE TO POLITICAL PRINCIPALS, JUDICIAL BODIES, AND OTHER POLICE FORCES

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Abstract

This exploratory paper aims at understanding how several police forces across Europe manage their relationships with three of the main actors they must coordinate with: politicians, judges and prosecutors, and other police forces. The paper particularly refers to the specific case of two Spanish police forces: the Catalan police force and the Madrid local police force. Our main research question is exploratory in nature: how do police forces relate to other security forces and to political and judicial principals? Methodologically, the paper is part of a wider FP7 research, COMPOSITE (Comparative Police Studies in the European Union).

Keywords

Inter-organizational coordination, police forces, stakeholders, Weberian politics-administration separation, principal-agent theory

INTRODUCTION

Today's complex world increases "wicked" problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and the need for organizational mechanisms combining dispersed power with unification (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Security issues are no exception. Terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, to name a few, are ever more complex phenomena covering many different kinds of actors and territories. These social problems require modern police forces capable of coordinating and collaborating with other police bodies but, also, with such as the political principal, other governmental departments, and judicial bodies.

Several theoretical streams are useful to approach coordination activities in such heterogeneous and fragmented context: network management (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bouckaert, Peters & Verhoest, 2010), and agency theory (Verhoest et al., 2010).

Given this context, this exploratory paper aims at understanding how several police forces across Europe manage their relationships with three of the main actors they must coordinate with: politicians, judges and prosecutors, and other police forces. The paper particularly refers to the specific case of two Spanish police forces: the Catalan police force (Mossos d'Esquadra) and the Madrid local police force (Policía Municipal de Madrid). Our main research question is exploratory in nature: how do police forces relate to other security forces and to political and judicial principals?

Methodologically, the paper is part of a wider research that uses the results of 439 in-depth interviews with police officers conducted during the first quarter of 2011 in the framework of COMPOSITE (Comparative Police Studies in the European Union), a FP7 project which looks into large scale change processes in police forces in ten European countries

and that is being conducted with the assistance of financial support from the European Community.

COLLABORATION, COMPETITION AND SUBORDINATION

In taking on our exploratory research question (how do police forces relate to other security forces and to political and judicial principals?) we build on three theoretical streams applicable to interorganizational administrative relations. We use Powell's interorganizational governance triad to elucidate whether parties compete, collaborate or have a superior-subordinate relationship. We may expect collaboration occurring between police forces and other police forces, political heads and judiciary counterparts. However, police forces may also compete for turf among themselves, and police forces are also subordinates of judiciary and political bodies. For elucidating the latter type of relations, we build on agency theory (applicable to police-judiciary and police-politicians relations) and Weberian bureaucracy (solely relevant to politics-police relations).

Interorganizational relations: Hierarchy, network, and competition

Relations among organizations can take very different forms. A first fundamental characterization is that between hierarchic, market or network relations (Powell, 1990). Building on transaction cost theory, Powell (1990) proposed this famous triad.

As a logic of organizing, networks have been contrasted to traditional forms of markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1990). These latter two forms have been the main conflicting images of interorganizational coordination modes (Williamson, 1975) -the means to organize the relationships between the different organizations. The market mode is clearly not applicable to interaction among public bodies (as is the case in this work), since these do not compete among themselves offering services to the same set of users/buyers.

Perhaps its conceptual equivalent would be non-programmed coordination and/or conflict via “laissez faire” (Keohane & Nye, 2000), where commitments among parties is low and interaction often confrontational. In their work, both Williamson and Powell refer to market transaction between buyer and seller when using the term competition. Here, we use it to refer to police forces relating antagonistically between them to protect one’s turf.

Hierarchy, in Powell’s (1990) and Williamson’s (1975) work, implied vertical integration of different units. Here we refer to hierarchy as in having power over. Thus a hierarchical relation is that which occurs between a political principal and an executive agency, between the judiciary and a police force. Principal-agent relations between political or judicial principals and police forces is an example of hierarchical mode: where these principals have limited formal authority over police forces.

The third inter-organizational mode, the network, implies complementarity and mutual adjustment between autonomous organizations which are interdependent (Powell, 1990).

Weber’s public bureaucracy

Max Weber was the first to explain and conceptualize bureaucracy. To guarantee an impartial administration, independent from the economic and political elites and, simultaneously not abusive of the citizens, modern capitalist democracies had designed public bureaucracy.

To protect public administration from elites, public bureaucracies: 1) guaranteed civil servants full-time and life-long employment, 2) selected them meritocratically based on specific qualifications, 3) and clearly delimited hierarchical levels within administration to avoid higher levels from dominating lower-levels.

Delimiting hierarchical levels in administration also protected citizens, since these could appeal to higher levels in case they were mistreated. Additionally, to protect citizens, 1) the civil servants' jurisdiction was officially fixed -to clearly delimit their power-, 2) the civil servants' private domicile was clearly segregated from the public bureau, and 3) the officials' activity were defined bureaucratically, by stable rules that attempted to reduce personal bias and to thoroughly document administrative activity.

Agency theory

Agency theory has been applied to many diverse situations where a principal delegates execution on an agent. This theory focuses on accountability by correcting for opportunistic behavior of agent (Van Slyke, 2007). A contract specifying such terms as input, outcome, processes, control mechanisms, and compensation and sanctions, mediate between principal and agent (Van Slyke, 2007). Agency theory assumes self-interested parties -and has been criticized for not taking into account other human motivations as altruism and loyalty (Eisenhardt, 1989)- which together with information asymmetry generate precontractual and postcontractual opportunism (Van Slyke, 2007). A major focus of this theoretical stream has been to develop and understand a mix of incentives, sanctions, information systems, and monitoring mechanisms employed to avoid opportunism (Van Slyke, 2007).

METHODOLOGY

The study used a mixed-method approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, where open questions were combined with near-survey data (Creswell, 2003) (See Table 1). This enabled the researchers to provide both qualitative analyses as well as statistical testing of relationships.

Qualitative analysis is a powerful method to identify topics and their interconnections if the phenomena under study are largely unexplored, as was the case here. Well-established methodological guidelines regarding case study research were followed by carefully preparing a structured interview protocol (Yin, 2009). The open ended questions were used to collect rich, context-specific and often qualitative information about who the most important stakeholders were and the characteristics of the relationships police-stakeholders. Additionally, a closed-question survey produced descriptive quantitative data that gave further information to subjects discussed earlier. In this respect, quantitative analysis offered the opportunity to find statistical relationships that could not be inferred at a single-country level (e.g., hidden relationships between the type of stakeholders' expectations and the job level of the police officer who identified them).

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The complete exploratory research involved 441 in-depth interviews with police officers conducted during the first quarter of 2011 regarding the external environment of police forces. However, this specific article refers to the particular case of two Spanish police forces—the Catalan police force (Mossos d'Esquadra) and the Madrid local police force (Policía Municipal de Madrid). 48 interviews were conducted with these two forces during February and March 2011. Table 2 shows the distribution of interviews across levels.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The quantitative survey was analyzed statistically. The qualitative data was content-analyzed using qualitative coding techniques.

The police forces

Mossos d'Esquadra is the name given to the Catalonian police force, the oldest civil force in Europe, founded in the eighteenth century to protect the people of Catalonia. After several ups and downs, the organization was dissolved after the Spanish Civil War and, after that, only in 1950, the Diputaci3n of Barcelona (the Provincial Government of Barcelona) was authorized to create a new section of the Mossos d'Esquadra that grew in number and attributions with the return of democracy to Spain. In 1980, this police body, which was a military body under the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the Spanish Ministry of Defence, moves to the Generalitat de Catalunya (Autonomous Government of Catalonia) and in 1983 the official Catalonia police force-Mossos d'Esquadra is created as a civilian police body.

Their main functions are: 1) legal policing (to investigate crimes and support the judges and courts), 2) security policing (to protect people and property, to maintain public order, to monitor public areas to prevent possible crimes and misdemeanours and to monitor, order and control traffic on the roads of Catalonia), and 3) administrative policing (to ensure that laws passed by the Parliament of Catalonia are observed). These tasks lead the Mossos d'Esquadra officers to act in different fields such as environment, personal protection, drugs, security of children, cultural heritage, information and communication technologies, crowd control at major events, explosives, underground searches, extreme situations, or prisons, just to give a few examples.

The local police of Madrid (Policía Municipal de Madrid) was created in 1848 by a law that regulated their responsibilities, their uniform, and their organizational structure. It was called "the Madrid's Round" and it included 76 people. In 1850, they took on new responsibilities such as preserving public order, protecting the neighbourhood, or

enforcing the municipal laws. Between 1924 and 1978, several events resulted in the body modernization although it is after the dictatorship that this police force really transforms as a consequence of the Constitution of 1978 and the new police model that it establishes. In 2003, the Policía Municipal de Madrid experiences a new change regarding their structure, their priorities and their management. A new program, Safe Madrid, still in place, is launched. Since then, this municipal police have more responsibilities that other local police forces have. For example, starting in 2009, the Policía Municipal de Madrid is also a judicial police. Also, in 2010, an agreement was signed between the National Police Force (Cuerpo de Policía Nacional) and the Madrid local police force. It was a political decision by which the local police started to give support and to be responsible of some of the tasks traditionally carried out by the National Police Force in the city of Madrid.

It has to be kept in mind that this sample is a subset of a larger sample. In total, 441 interviews relating to 17 police forces in ten European countries were conducted. However, neither the sample of police forces nor that of the interviewees (or the set of countries, for that matter) can be regarded as representative. Given binding capacity constraints, representativeness was out of reach (by far). Rather, we opted for depth and richness. Thus, although two police forces were extensively studied in Spain, the possibility that there are differences between these focal police forces and other police forces in Spain cannot be excluded.

FINDINGS

Although the interviewees identified more than twenty different external actors, the following five were the most important and the ones more mentioned in the interviews: governments and politicians at different levels, judicial bodies, other police forces, citizens

and citizens' organizations, and businesses and trade organizations. This section shows the results related to the first three external actors.

Qualitative characteristics of relationships

Table 3 summarizes the qualitative characteristics of the relationships between the focal police organizations (Mossos d'Esquadra and Policía Municipal de Madrid) and their political principals, the judiciary, and other Spanish police forces.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Political principals – police force relationships

Regarding governments and politicians at different levels, Mossos d'Esquadra talked about the regional government (that is, the Generalitat de Catalunya or Autonomous Government of Catalonia) and, in particular, about the Department of the Interior (since Mossos d'Esquadra is under this department) and the Policía Municipal de Madrid referred to the Madrid City Council and, specifically, to the Government Area of Security and Mobility. The relationship between political principals and police forces can be characterized as one of political principals' authority over the forces. They also police forces to follow their instructions

Additionally, political principals expect the police to implement the security public policies. They also request security-related information to the police activity, such as security indicators.

Resisting instructions by political principals results in a lack of political support to the police force. This has been very visible in the case of Mossos d'Esquadra. During the last political mandate there was a clear “divorce” between the Ministry of the Interior and the Catalan police force. The Ministry was not supportive of the police force, who in turn felt the politician’s instructions were in conflict with their priorities.

There are certain differences between the two police forces studied. While the local police of Madrid have relationships with the local government (Madrid City Council), Mossos d'Esquadra interact for the most part with the Catalan Ministry of Interior but also with local governments across Catalonia. These local governments expect the Catalan police will help them with local security issues (for example, with information about the security problems in the area) as well as with the enforcement of the municipal ordinances¹.

Judicial bodies – police force relationships

Without a doubt, judges and public prosecutors are a very relevant external party for the police. Generally speaking, they expect the police force to be their implementation arm regarding investigations and detentions. Thus, the relationship between the judiciary and the police bodies is also a relationship based on authority. In order to meet their expectations, the police try to follow the judges and the public prosecutors’ guidelines. They investigate the facts, manage official notifications and subpoenas, and write reports. In Madrid and Catalonia other police forces exist (National Police Force and Civil Guard, for example) that judicial bodies may use. To avoid losing turf in their respective territories,

¹ In fact, when Mossos d'Esquadra deployed throughout Catalonia, the expectations were really high because mayors thought they were going to solve all their security problems and that was going to result in cost savings. That never happened since the police could simply not take care of everything (there are almost 1,000 local governments in Catalonia).

both Mossos d'Esquadra and the Policía Municipal de Madrid stated that satisfying judges' instructions was a priority.

The relationship between judges and public prosecutors and the police forces are good. In the main, both police forces meet their expectations. Oddly enough, this results in a large amount of bureaucratic desk work. Actually, some of the interviewees reported that performing well has a risk: the police might become the judges' "postman" regarding official notifications and subpoenas. However, a good performance gives also rise to a higher level of trust and, therefore, a higher level of autonomy. Also, it can result in more requests directed to these specific police forces.

There are no differences between the two forces regarding this external party. However, it is important to note that the local police of Madrid have only recently become a judicial police force (in 2004²). Despite their inexperience, they are thought to be a very professional and efficient police force and they are requested more often than other police forces with responsibilities within the city of Madrid. This means they are meeting this actor's expectations to a large extent.

Police force-police force relationships

Other police forces are probably the external party more interviewees referred to. In this respect, there are two types of police forces the respondents talked about: local police forces and national police forces (both the National Police Force and the Civil Guard). Although a few officers in Madrid referred to other local police forces as important

² Since 2010, after an agreement between the Madrid City Council and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, the Policía Municipal de Madrid have more competencies on the subject of investigating penal offences.

stakeholders, these are more relevant for Mossos d'Esquadra than for their counterpart in the city of Madrid.

Coordination is the formal expectation of these police forces although, actually, several conflicts arise when police forces work together. Several interviewees reported it is hard to coordinate because, despite what the law says about each police force's responsibilities, there are fuzzy and unclear situations. In this regard, there are probably more incidents with the national police forces. In the case of Mossos d'Esquadra, there is some resentment after the Catalan police force took over and most of the National Police Force and the Civil Guard units and officers had to leave Catalonia. This does not help coordination.

In the case of the Policia Municipal de Madrid, an agreement was signed in June 2010 and the local police force took some responsibilities in the city of Madrid that were traditionally part of the National Police Force's functions, which also created bitterness among street-level national police officers³. These circumstances both in Catalonia and Madrid explain the unofficial expectation of other police forces: they would like Mossos d'Esquadra and the Policia Municipal de Madrid not to get involved.

Dissatisfaction is the feeling Mossos d'Esquadra and Policia Municipal de Madrid have, particularly among the senior officers, but not only, when they work together with national police forces. Everybody seems to perceive that the required coordination results in a lack of autonomy and in delays, particularly because a lot of information exchange is needed (the databases are not connected yet). What's more, some of the interviewees from Mossos d'Esquadra even referred to interference.

³ A lot of paper work is actually done by the Policia Municipal de Madrid as a consequence of such agreement. Also, this local police force has now responsibilities on routine tasks such as surveillance.

On the topic of other police forces, it is important to refer to the differences between the two focal forces. As has already been stated, it is Mossos d'Esquadra the police force that has to interact more with other police forces. This is due to the fact that the Catalan police force is a regional force and, therefore, has responsibilities in the whole Catalonia despite the existence of police forces in specific towns/cities.

The expectations of these local police forces are different since there is a lot of diversity in size, history or responsibilities. There are some police forces with 10 officers and there are some others, like the Guardia Urbana in Barcelona, particularly brought up several times by the interviewees, which dates back to the nineteenth century and has more than 3.000 officers. However, local police expect support from the regional police.

Finally, the level of satisfaction with the Catalan police body is also different depending on the local police force. The local police force of Barcelona seem to be the most difficult police force to coordinate with. Deployment of Mossos d'Esquadra in Barcelona ended back in 2008. Until then, security was the Guardia Urbana's main responsibility. This has enormously changed and there are conflicts because for several local police officers there is not that much clarity on the differentiation between their responsibilities and those of Mossos d'Esquadra.

These different situations explain the different features of the relationships among different police forces: on one hand, coordination / collaboration is always expected. However, due to several circumstances, competition often prevails. Finally, since Mossos d'Esquadra is a regional police force and Policia Municipal de Madrid is a local one, sometimes national police bodies, such as the Spanish National Police Force or the Civil Guard feel they can impose their authority on our focal police bodies.

Table 4 includes supporting quotes for the findings presented above.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Quantitative characteristics of relationships

Table 5 presents the results for the quantitative survey. Two interesting findings are inferred from Table 5. First, police forces manage powerful stakeholders (political principals and judicial bodies) but there is a difference between the influence and the formal authority of these actors on the police organizations. In this respect, political principals have higher influence on the police activities and judicial bodies have more formal authority. However, it is easier to meet political principals' expectations than the judiciary's ones. Also, political principals' expectations are more actively managed by the police than the judiciary's. Finally, the police performs better on the former external party's expectations than on the latter's. Therefore, it seems that real influence on police activities is more important than both formal authority and difficulty to meet expectations.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Second, relationships with other police forces are probably the hardest relationships for both the Policía Municipal de Madrid and Mossos d'Esquadra, particularly regarding the management of their expectations. Thus, on one hand, other police forces have obviously a very good understanding of policing and their expectations are quite predictable. Nevertheless, these expectations are more difficult to meet and less actively managed by our focal police organizations. Also, their performance on other Spanish police forces' expectations is worse than their performance on other parties' expectations.

These results support our qualitative findings that made evident the coordination-competition tension that characterizes the relationship with other police forces. It is worthy of note that relationships between the Catalan police force and other police forces are more difficult than relationships between the latter and the local police of Madrid (see Table 6).

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

In this respect, other police forces' expectations are quite more predictable for Mossos d'Esquadra than for the Policía Municipal de Madrid (this might have to do with the fact that Mossos d'Esquadra needs to interact with more police forces than the local police). In spite of this, they also have more difficulty to meet these expectations. Again, our qualitative findings already referred to this and to the fact that Mossos d'Esquadra need to coordinate with several local police forces (very diverse in size, history or responsibilities) and with the national police ones while the Policía Municipal de Madrid' relationships with other police bodies are basically reduced to contacts with the Spanish National Police Force.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Our preliminary findings can be distilled as follows:

- 1) Police-police relations are competitive and most difficult to manage. Yet police forces understand each other most. Mutual understanding and similarity is not sufficient to create a collaborative relation. Turf uncertainty must be reduced to a minimum to avoid

competition. This explains why the Catalan regional police have greater difficulties with national police forces than the Madrid local police.

Additionally, historical patterns of responsibility transfers from one force to another, generate resentments among those losing turf, which hinders coordination.

2) Principal (political and judicial)-police relations are hierarchical in nature. Understandably, both political and judicial bodies have authority over police forces. The legislative framework confers these powers on political heads and judges. These principals have consequences on police forces, via budgetary allocations, assigning work-loads, acknowledging a police force's centrality in the territory, and reputational effects.

3) Police dedicate more efforts to manage political principals rather than judicial ones. An interesting finding is that police forces dedicate greater efforts to satisfy political principals than judicial ones. Even if judicial ones have greater formal power over the police forces. The quantitative findings tell us that political principals have, however, greater overall influence over police forces. Yet, police forces were aware that judicial bodies are more difficultly satisfied. Taken together, this tells us that overall real power determines the magnitude of coordination efforts, more so than formal power or difficulty of relationship.

This points to another fact, that the Weberian separation of politician head and administration formally applied between political principals and police forces, does not eliminate the real influence the former have over the latter.

Regarding further research, we aim at exploring if these findings hold throughout Europe. Thus we plan to expand the sample horizontally using the data collected by COMPOSITE researchers. Also, we plan to drill deeper vertically, in future rounds of data collection, to understand in more detail these relationships, which are fundamental for the well-being of Western democracies.

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TABLES

Table 1. Interview outline⁴

Question 4a: Who are the key external parties (individuals, groups, or organizations) of your police force/unit with respect to THIS core activity?
Question 4b: What are the key issues/expectations/concerns of these external parties?
Question 4c: How does your police force manage the expectations of this external party?
Question 4d.1: Do you feel that you have managed to influence this external party in a way that helps you in your activities?

⁴ Since this was a larger interview that tackled different issues, we only reproduce the section related to external parties.

Question 4d.1: How was this done?
Question 4e: How will meeting the expectations of this external party impact upon your police force?
Question 4f: How will not meeting the expectations of this external party impact upon your police force?
<p>Question 4g: Please answer the structured questions per identified external party.</p> <p>This external party has formal authority over our activities (1..7)</p> <p>This external party has high influence on our activities (1..7)</p> <p>This external party has a good understanding of policing (1..7)</p> <p>This external party's expectations are highly predictable (1..7)</p> <p>It is very difficult for us to meet this external party's expectations (1..7)</p> <p>We actively manage this external party's expectations (1..7)</p> <p>We perform very well on this external party's expectations (1..7)</p>

Table 2. Distribution of interviews across levels

Type of interviewee	Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan police force)	Policía Municipal de Madrid (local police of Madrid)
Top/strategic	3	4
Senior	6	4
Supervisory	8	4
Operational/front line	4	8
External	4	3
Total	25	23

Table 3. Qualitative characteristics of relationships

External party	Type of relationship	Key expectations	Impact on police
Political principals	Authority	Law enforcement Implementation of the security public policies Provision of information for political decision making	Political support
Judicial bodies	Authority	Executions of judicial orders regarding investigations	Reputation Workload
Other police forces	Authority Coordination Competition	Coordination	Effectiveness

Table 4. Supportive quotes

External party	Quotes
Political principals	<p>“They expect us to implement the security strategies and to share technical knowledge”</p> <p>“They want us to control compliance with municipal ordinances”</p> <p>“The police have to implement their security policies”</p> <p>“They focus their expectations in obtaining coherent and high</p>

	<p>quality information”</p> <p>“If the police do their job, we will get more political support”</p> <p>“They want to have a tool to implement their idea of security”</p> <p>“They want information, reports in order to make decisions”</p> <p>“Mayors had a lot of expectation when Mosso d’Esquadra deployed throughout Catalonia. They thought that Mossos were going to take care of everything and that this would result in cost savings since less local police would be needed”</p> <p>“Probably, the police will have more political support”</p> <p>“Mayors want to be informed about security issues that affect their town”</p>
Judicial bodies	<p>“They expect us to respond to their requests quickly and efficiently”</p> <p>“On one hand, they want us to write proper reports because this will greatly facilitate their work. Yet, they also want us to deal with their direct requests effectively and quickly”</p> <p>“They want the police to follow their instructions”</p> <p>“They want the police to solve all their problems, more than we should”</p> <p>“They want the work done and they expect Mossos to do it properly”</p> <p>“There is a danger of ending up as the judiciary’s postman”</p> <p>“We have a good image among judges”</p> <p>“Meeting the judges’ expectations means having extra work. This extra work is often related to bureaucratic tasks, which means we</p>

	<p>can devote our time to investigation”</p> <p>“We do a very good job reporting. Therefore, judges are pretty happy with us”</p>
Other police forces	<p>“We have to work together to solve public safety issues”</p> <p>“National police forces expect to use us as an additional resource to achieve their goals”</p> <p>“They expect us to conduct the more routine and bureaucratic tasks”</p> <p>“They expect collaboration and coordination in the management of incidents”</p> <p>“They do not want us to take part when they think they have the competency to do so”</p> <p>“Local police forces expect us to help whenever they do not have resources to act”</p> <p>“We are always competing because roles and responsibilities are not clear. They are on the paper but not at the street level”</p> <p>“Relationships with this party are difficult. It is a relationship of competitor-collaborator”</p> <p>“Relations at the street level are much better than at institutional level”</p> <p>“We try to coordinate with other police forces but it is very difficult. Often, good results depend on how willing people are to work together”</p> <p>“It is a continuous fight. Mossos d’Esquadra are the police force of Catalonia and national police forces seem not to understand that”</p>

	“When different police forces cooperate, the exchange of information is better and more efficiency is attained”
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Table 5. Quantitative characteristics of relationships

Issues	Political principals	Judicial bodies	Other police forces
Formal authority over the police activities	5,82	6,36	3,73
High influence on the police activities	6,11	5,90	4,53
Good understanding of policing	5,47	4,90	6,23
Highly predictable expectations	5,41	5,36	5,80
Difficulty to meet its expectations	3,64	3,72	3,93
Expectations actively managed by the police	5,88	5,18	4,93
Well performance on its expectations	5,88	5,72	5,36

Table 6. Quantitative characteristics of relationships by police force

Issues	Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan police force)	Policía Municipal de Madrid (local police of Madrid)
Formal authority over the police activities	3,35	4,06
High influence on the police activities	4,64	4,43
Good understanding of policing	6,28	6,18
Highly predictable expectations	6,07	5,56
Difficulty to meet its expectations	4,28	3,62
Expectations actively managed by the police	4,92	4,93
Well performance on its expectations	5,42	5,31